Regardless of how it is obtained, Success = Credibility

I know that I said that this blog was moving to At Home Plate.com, and it still is. But I couldn't just stop writing here; I love it too much. I love the comments and emails I get, and I appreciate everyone that reads my articles.

So, with that being said, there will be much less articles posted at this address than before, but there will still be articles posted here for reading.

So here is my first article here since the “death” of this blog.

It's reincarnation!!!

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If you are looking for statistics, projections, and the like in this article, as I normally write about, well I am sorry. This article will contain none of those.

This article is written because of a segment I listened to on ESPN’s radio show, “The Herd,” hosted by Colin Cowherd. The segment basically was about how success breeds credibility…regardless of how that success is obtained. Cowherd went through examples of people who are deemed “credible” by peers and critics alike, because of the success that they “backed into.”

This got me thinking about a situation like that in baseball. It didn’t take me long to think of the perfect example of a person in baseball being deemed “credible/great” because of the success he has had, even though he “backed into,” that success.

Let’s go back to the 2003 playoff’s to start the story of this “credible” person. In the 2003 playoffs the Boston Red Sox lost the American League Championship Series to the New York Yankees. It is widely believed that the reason that they lost this series was because in Game 7, then-manager Grady Little left starting pitcher Pedro Martinez in the game much too long. Because of this, Martinez wore down, became more hittable, and eventually gave up the tying run to the Yankees after his team was up by 3 runs. Then, in extra innings, long after Martinez was yanked, the Red Sox lost the game, and the series.

Because the responsibility for this loss was placed squarely on the shoulders of Little, he was eventually fired. After that, the Red Sox were left with a great team, with no manager.

So the search for one began.

In the midst of the search, the Red Sox made a trade for a pitcher named Curt Schilling. Curt Schilling was brought in to be the “missing link” from that 2003 team; the piece that was missing from the Red Sox’s World Series Championship puzzle. Since Schilling was such a big commodity, he also carried some weight on the way the team was run. Knowing this, Schilling being the opportunist that he is, decided to recommend one of his former managers that he liked to the Red Sox as a candidate for their managerial opening.

After a few weeks of negotiating, the manager that Schilling had recommended was hired. Now the Red Sox had a new ace for their rotation, and a new manager who they thought wouldn’t make the same mistake as Little did the season before. Every thing was perfect for a World Series Championship in 2004.

It is hard to believe that the manager the Red Sox chose was more than anything but a favor to their new star pitcher because it was only a few years ago that he was fired from his former managerial job with the Philadelphia Phillies because of an inability to lead his team.

While he was in Philadelphia, fans slashed the tires on his car because of how terrible he was. This manager was truly lucky to have had his prior experiences with Schilling in Philadelphia. Little did he know that those experiences would lead him to future “credibility” in the area of managing a baseball team.

Now we all know how the 2004 season played out for the Boston Red Sox. They won the World Series for the first time since 1918. When a team does this, the manager is the person given most credit for his teams success, and rightfully so. So, with that holding true, this newly hired manager was given that credit, and was deemed “credible” because of the Red Sox’s success.

Now, this same manager who was run out of Philadelphia just a few years ago, was being deemed a “great” manager. Is this fair? Isn’t it obvious that he just happened to be available when a great team, one that was already predicted to win 95-100 games before he was hired, had a vacancy? Isn’t it obvious that he was there because of the recommendation of Curt Schilling? Isn’t it obvious that he “backed into” the success he just had, and subsequently, the “credibility” he now holds?

If you haven’t guessed it already, the now “credible” person I am talking about is Boston Red Sox manager Terry Francona.

If you ask anybody—go ahead and try—they will tell you that Terry Francona is a great manager.

Why do they answer this way? Well, just look, he just led a title-deprived team to its first World Series Championship in 86 years, that’s why.

Well folks, it is of utmost importance to look at how success was obtained by a person, before deeming them “great/credible” in their field.

It is clear that Francona is a good manager. But great? Credible? Not in my opinion. This is a guy among the ranks of Ringo Starr and Kevin Federline when it comes to luck.

He was in the right place at the right time.

Now, I don’t want to take anything away from the Red Sox, what they did was phenomenal. But, honestly, how many people out there think that they could have lead the 2004 Red Sox to the World Series Title? I know I do.

This example is just to show that “success” is not an easy thing to accomplish, and the label of success shouldn’t be so easily handed out as it was with Francona.

Let me use this example:

Lets say that tomorrow Sports Illustrated decides to hire a random website baseball writer to write a weekly baseball column in their magazine. They make the call, and the writer they end up hiring is “yours truly.”

After you read my first column, you would assume that I have succeeded in the field of writing because, after all, I am writing for the biggest sports magazine in the world.

Because of this success that you assume I have had, my writing becomes a lot more credible than what it is now, doesn’t it? When, in fact, I am just as credible as I am today.

I would have backed into success, and would have been deemed as a “credible” writer because of it. Clearly, this is not fair to the writers who worked their butts off for the credibility they now hold.

This effortless grant of credibility is not fair to the people who did work hard to achieve success in their field. They are the ones who deserve the credibility. Not the lucky ones who just backed into success.

So next time you are about to label someone a success, and deem them with the credibility that comes with it, take a minute and research how that success was obtained.

Thank you for reading. If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.

***I am a die-hard Red Sox fan, and a Francona-lover.***

Serious Baseball now at "At Home Plate.com"

Serious Baseball will no longer be published here at this address. This web log will slowly but surely be absorbed by At Home Plate.com.

New articles will continue to be written by both Matthew Souders and I under the new Serious Baseball column there.

Please visit Serious Baseball at At Home Plate.com com to view our introduction articles.

Thank you to everybody who did visit the site, and I hope you continue to read "Serious Baseball" at At Home Plate.com.

All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran--Ballpark Adjusted (Edit)

You may have noticed that one of my previous articles, “All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran-Ballpark Adjusted,” was pulled off the site yesterday. This was due to some errors I made in calculating the projected seasons for Beltran. It was pulled because I did not want an article containing false information on the site for any longer that it was. I apologize for the error, and have corrected it. The article you are reading is actually the correct version of “All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran. Ballpark-Adjusted”

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If you recall, in my prior article “All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran,” I used a “split-the-difference” method to project a “probable, split-the-difference, and best-possible” 2005 season for Carlos Beltran.

At the time of the article, Beltran was yet to be signed, and was still looking for a home. The Houston Astros, New York Yankees, and New York Mets were all reportedly close to signing the free agent.

Shortly after the publishing of the article Beltran signed a seven-year, $119 million contract with the New York Mets.

With this signing, Beltran’s new home ballpark becomes the very pitcher-friendly Shea Stadium in New York City. With this information, I can now project Beltran’s 2005 season, adjusted for Shea Stadium—something I was unable to do before.

If you recall, I had Beltran continuing his current upward trend into 2005.

As I did in the original article, I will not bore you with a step-by-step detailed explanation of how I calculated Beltran’s projected numbers, I will just present them.

***To read more about the seasons I project, and why I project them, please read earlier article “All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran.”***

The first thing I must do before projecting ballpark-adjusted seasons though, is to ballpark-adjust Beltran’s previous three seasons (because those are the seasons used to determine the projections).

Here are Beltran’s previous three seasons, ballpark-adjusted:

Stats presented as so: AB, AVG/OBP/SLG-OPS, (AVG/HR/RBI), SB/CS, K/BB

2002 (Kansas City Royals—Kauffman Stadium): 617 AB--.253/.331/.446-.777 OPS--(.253/22/97)—35/7 (83.3%) SB/CS—135/71 (1.90/1) K/BB

2003 (Kansas City Royals—Kauffman Stadium): 514 AB--.295/.380/.506-.886 OPS--(.295/25/93)—41/4 (91.1%) SB/CS—81/72 (1.13/1) K/BB

2004 (Kansas City Royals—Kauffman Stadium, Houston Astros—Minute Maid Park): 602 AB--.268/.368/.511-.878 OPS--(.268/32/105)—42/3 (93.3%) SB/CS—101/92 (1.10/1) K/BB

If you recall, without park adjustments, 2004 was Beltran’s best season in the previous three seasons (according to OPS); and was the season used to project 2005 by splitting the differences between that season and his previous three year averages. When park factors are included though, 2003 becomes his best season in that span (according to OPS).

This being the case, Beltran’s projected 2005 season would normally be determined by the differences between that season (2003) and his previous three-year averages; but since he only had 521 AB’s in 03’, due to injury, I will still use 2004 as his best season in that span. I do this because 2004 is a better representation of a “best season,” because Beltran wasn’t injured, and had an AB total closer to his career average.

Here is the “probable, split-the-difference, and best-possible” seasons that I projected in the original article. Underneath each of them will be Beltran’s ballpark adjusted season of the same name.

Stats presented as so: AB, AVG/OBP/SLG-OPS, (AVG/HR/RBI), SB/CS, K/BB

Split the difference

2005: 606 AB--.260/.368/.559-.927 OPS--(.260/42/105)--43/2 (93.3%) SB/CS--99/99 (1.00/1) K/BB

2005 (Park Adjusted): 603 AB--.262/.361/.508--.869 OPS—(.262/33/104)—43/2 (95.5%) SB/CS—97/97 (1.00/1) K/BB


Best Possible

2005: 615 AB--.251/.369/.576-.944 OPS--(.251/46/105)--43/1 (97.7%) SB/CS--95/108 (.880/1) K/BB

2005 (Park Adjusted): 605 AB--.259/.365/.525--.890 OPS--(.259/36/105)—43/1 (97.7%) SB/CS—91/105 (.867/1) K/BB


Probable

2005: 610 AB--.256/.368/.568-.936 OPS--(.256/44/105)--43/2 (93.3%) SB/CS--97/104 (.933/1) K/BB

2005 (Park adjusted): 604 AB--.261/.363/.517--.880 OPS—(.261/34/105), 43/2 (93.3%) SB/CS, 94/101 (.931/1) K/BB


As you can see, in each season, Shea Stadium lowered Beltran’s statistics.

Large differentials between statistics in ballpark-neutral seasons, and ballpark-adjusted seasons are due to the fact that Beltran’s three previous seasons (02’, 03’, and 04’) were played in parks that favor hitters. Because of this, his actual statistics become lower when adjusted. Factor that in with his move to a ballpark (Shea Stadium) that heavily favors pitchers, and the difference between the “too-large” numbers he put up in the hitter’s parks, and the “too-small” numbers he would put up in a pitcher’s park becomes noticeably large—like in the cases above.

That being said, and hoping it wasn’t too confusing, the numbers put up by Beltran in 2005, should be expected to be along the lines of his ballpark-adjusted “probable” projected 2005 (as shown above).

Thank you for reading.

Frank Bundy III

If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.

Blue Jays Acquire Hillenbrand

On January 12, 2005 the Arizona Diamondbacks traded 29-year-old 1B/3B Shea Hillenbrand to the Blue Jays in exchange for 25 year old pitching prospect Adam Peterson.

With the Diamondbacks recent acquisitions of 3B Troy Glaus and RF Shawn Green, the only position left for Hillenbrand to play, if he were to stay in Arizona, was 1B. The Diamondbacks decided to go with a cheaper alternative at that position, and chose the 24-year-old Chad Tracy, making Hillenbrand expendable.

On the other end of the trade, the Blue Jays were in need of a first basemen because their former first basemen, Carlos Delgado, was not offered arbitration, leaving a huge hole at that position.

Since the Blue Jays already have a fulltime third basemen in newly acquired 31-year-old Corey Koskie, Hillenbrand will play either 1B or DH. He will split time between these two positions with Blue Jays former third basemen Eric Hinske, who is also forced to change positions because of the acquisition of Koskie.

Here is a look at the players both teams are receiving in the deal. Translated and actual statistics will be presented.

***For Peterson, only actual statistics will be presented, because translated ones were not available.***

Blue Jays receive:

Shea Hillenbrand

(Stats presented as: AB, AVG/OBP/SLG—OPS, HR, RBI, K/BB)

2004 (Actual Stats): 562 AB, .310/.348/.464--.812 OPS, 15 HR, 80 RBI, 49/24 K/BB

2004 (Translated Stats): .299/.338/.447--.269 EqA

Career (Actual Stats): 2179 AB, .288/.322/.448--.770 OPS, 65 HR, 274 RBI, 275/86 K/BB

Career (Translated Stats): .286/.323/.449--.263 EqA


Diamondbacks receive:

Adam Peterson:

2004 (AA): 28 IP, 2.54 ERA, 6.4 H/9—0.3 HR/9—3.2 BB/9—12.1 K/9

2004 (AAA): 21 IP, 12.86 ERA, 16.3 H/9—2.6 HR/9—6.9 BB/9—8.1 K/9

2004 (MLB): 3 IP, 16.87 ERA, 7 Hits—1 HR—3 BB—2 K

Career (Minor League): 140 IP, 4.23 ERA, 8.4 H/9—0.8 HR/9—3.5 BB/9—8.5 K/9

Is this a joke? The Blue Jays get a very solid player in exchange for a below average minor-leaguer, who has gotten worse every level he has gone up? Did the Blue Jays really rip the Diamondbacks off this bad?

Let’s look at the money side of the deal before answering the preceding questions.

Peterson, as a minor leaguer, will make the league minimum. Hillenbrand, on the other hand, is due for arbitration in 2005. Knowing that he made $2.6 million in 2005, and accounting for the good season he had in 2004, I’m going to guess that arbitration grants him around $4 million in 2005.

After seeing the financial aspect of this deal, the Diamondbacks still got robbed. I do understand that Hillenbrand had to go (see position scenarios above), and that the Diamondbacks save a good amount of money in this deal, but they could have gotten much better player(s) in exchange for him than Peterson.

Peterson (25) is past the age where he is considered a prospect, doesn’t have very good career numbers throughout his minor league career, and has played his worst baseball at the highest levels.

On top of all this, paying only $4 million for Hillenbrand is a pretty good bargain for the Blue Jays.

Blue Jays general manager J.P. Riccardi deserves a huge “pat on the back” for completing this deal. He saw a team that had no room for a good player not making a huge amount of money, and then went and got him for an underachieving, older, minor leaguer.

Way to go Blue Jays.

Thank you for reading.

Frank Bundy III

If you have any question, comments, concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.

Diamondbacks acquire Shawn Green

On January 10, 2005 the Los Angeles Dodgers and Arizona Diamondbacks completed the long awaited trade sending $10 million, and 32-year-old RF Shawn Green to the Arizona Diamondbacks in exchange for four minor leaguers.

In order for this trade to occur, Green had to waive the “no-trade” clause in his contract with the Dodgers. Green was only willing to do this if the Diamondbacks came up with a contract extension he would be content with. After about a week of negotiating, and many rumors of the trade not happening, Green and the Diamondbacks did finally agree on an extension.

With the new contract extension included, Green’s salaries for each of the next three years now look like so:

2005- $10.5 million

2006- $8 million

2007- $9.5 million

2008- $10 million option with $2 million dollar buyout clause.

Not including the option year of 2008, Green’s new contract essentially pays him $30 million over the next three seasons.

In exchange for Green and the $10 million that Los Angeles sent with him, Arizona sent the Dodgers 20 year old minor league catcher Dioner Navarro, and minor league RHP’s William Jaurez (23 years old), Danny Muegge (23 years old), and Beltran Perez (23 years old).

Here is a look at each players 2004 and career, translated and actual stats:

***For the minor league players involved, only actual statistics will be presented because translated statistics were unavailable***

Diamondbacks receive:

Shawn Green:

2004:
Actual Statistics: .266/.352/.459, 811 OPS, 28 HR, 86 RBI, 114/72 (1.58/1) K/BB
Translated Statistics: .270/.354/.470, .280 EqA

Career:
Actual Statistics: .282/.357/.508, .865 OPS, 281 HR, 885 RBI, 1076/600 (1.79/1) K/BB
Translated Statistics: .288/.360/.524, .295 EqA

Dodgers receive:

Dioner Navarro:

2004 (AA Trenton, AAA Columbus):
.263 AVG/.341 OBP/.366 SLG-.707 OPS, 4 HR , 45 RBI, 61/47 (1.30/1) K/BB Career (Minor Leagues):
.277 AVG/.350 OBP/.402 SLG--.752 OPS, 21 HR, 168 RBI, 198/138 (1.43/1) K/BB

William Juarez

2004 (A South Bend, AA El Paso):
6-8 W-L, 3.71 ERA, 121.3 IP, 8.8 H/9—0.6 HR/9—2.1 BB/9—8.5 K/9

Career (Minor League):
27-19 W-L, 3.07 ERA, 408.0 IP, 9.1 H/9—0.4 HR/9—2.2 BB/9—7.6 K/9

Beltran Perez

2004 (AA El Paso):
2-6 W-L, 4.41 ERA, 104.0 IP, 8.8 H/9—0.9 HR/9—4.0 BB/9—6.7 K/9

Career (Minor League):
31/22 W-L, 3.98 ERA, 480.0 IP, 9.0 H/9—0.7 HR/9—2.9 BB/9—8.1 K/9

Danny Muegge

2004 (A South Bend):
14-4 W-L, 3.12 ERA, 153.0 IP, 8.8 H/9—0.9 HR/9—2.5 BB/9—6.1 K/9

Career (Minor League):
16-7 W-L, 3.32 ERA, 176.0 IP, 9.2 H/9—0.9 HR/9—2.5 BB/9—6.4 K/9

As discussed in my earlier article “Yankees acquire Big Unit,” Navarro is a very good prospect at catcher.

A look at William Jaurez’s number show that he, himself, is also a very good prospect.

Perez, on the other hand, struggled last season. Although he has put up good numbers throughout his minor league career, it may be a concern that he stuggled at his highest current level of competition, AA El Paso.

Muegge, in essentially one minor league season, has put up very good numbers.

All four of the prospects that the Diamondbacks gave up in this deal, show signs of having success in the future…which is all any team (Dodgers) can ask for out of any minor leaguer.

Since the four minor leaguers essentially do not count against the Dodgers major league payroll, and will be making league-minimum salaries anyways, they are essentially not adding any money to the Dodgers total payroll; but to fully look at the financial aspects of this deal for the Dodgers, Shawn Green’s old contract with them must be looked at.

Under that contract, Green was signed through 2005, and was due to make $16 million that year. After looking at that figure, paying $10 million to the Diamondbacks to complete this deal doesn’t look so bad. The Dodgers actually save $6 million by completing this deal ($16 million owed to Green minus $10 million paid to Arizona).

The financial analysis on the Diamondbacks side show an addition of $30 million (Green’s salry) to their payroll through 2007. Factoring in the $10 million received from the Dodgers to help pay part of Green’s salary though, will show that the Diamondbacks will actually pay less than $30 million to Green throughout his stay there.

Subtracting those figures from eachother will show that the Diamondbacks are only paying $20 million for Green’s serives through 2007 ($30 million minus $10 million). This equals out to $6.66 million a year ($20 million divided by 3 years).


The role the Green will be asked to fill for the Diamondbacks is obvious. He will be asked to do what he has his entire career, be the everyday right fielder.

On the other end of the trade, the Dodgers already have their replacement for Green in RF. The younger, newly signed, 29-year-old J.D. Drew


After looking at the financial aspects, as well as the statistics of each involved player, I will say that the Dodgers got the better end of this deal. I say this though because a deeper look at Green’s statistics in each of the past three seasons will show that he has declined in many major offensive categories:

(AVG/OBP/SLG)

2002: .285/.385/.558

2003: .280/.355/.460

2004: .266/.352/.459

Even though $6.66 million per year for a player with Green’s career statistics is a bargain, it really isnt that great of a bargain when one sees the decline he is in.

As for the Dodgers, on top of saving $6 million, which they can use to help pay newly acquired RF J.D. Drew, they get four good prospects.

The best thing about this deal for the Dodgers though, is that with every team (including the Diamondbacks) knowing that the Dodgers were eager to part with Green because of the acquistion of Drew; you’d think the Dodgers would be so eager to trade him away that they’d get a bad package in return for him, but they didn’t. The Dodgers stayed calm, and negotiated themselves into a very good deal.

Good job Paul Depodesta (GM of the Dodgers)

Thank you for reading.

Frank Bundy III

If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.

Yankees Acquire Big Unit

Pending a physical, the New York Yankees and Arizona Diamondbacks recently have completed the biggest trade of the 2004 off-season. In the deal, the Diamondbacks will send the 41 year old, future Hall of Fame left handed pitcher Randy Johnson to the Yankees in exchange for 28 year old right handed pitcher Javier Vazquez, 23 year old left handed pitcher Brad Halsey, 20 year old minor league catcher Dioner Navarro, and $9 million.

Here is a look at each players translated, and actual career and 2004 statistics:

***For Halsey and Navarro only actual Stats will be presented since no translated stats were available***

Yankees receive:

Randy Johnson:

2004:
Actual Stats: 16-14 W-L, 2.60 ERA, 245.7 IP, 177 Hits (6.5 H/9), 18 HR (0.7 HR/9), 44 BB (1.6 BB/9), 290 K (10.6 K/9)

Translated Stats: 2.30 ERA, 5.7 H/9--0.5 HR/9--1.2 BB/9--9.5 K/9

Career:
Actual Stats: 246-128 W-L, 3.07 ERA, 3368.0 IP, 2612 Hits (7.0 H/9), 301 HR (0.8 HR/9), 1302 BB (3.5 BB/9), 4161 K (11.1 K/9)

Translated Stats: 2.79 ERA, 6.3 H/9--0.7 HR/9—2.9 BB/9—10.8 K/9


Diamondbacks receive:

Javier Vazquez:

2004
Actual Stats: 14-10 W-L, 4.91 ERA, 198.0 IP, 195 Hits (8.9 H/9), 33 HR (1.5 HR/9), 60 BB (2.7 BB/9), 150 K (8.8 K/9)

Translated Stats: 4.01 ERA, 7.3 H/9—1.2 HR/9—2.5 BB/9—6.1 K/9

Career:
Actual Stats: 78-78 W-L, 4.26 ERA, 1427.0 IP, 1430 Hits (9.0 H/9), 188 HR (1.2 HR/9), 391 BB (2.5 BB/9), 1226 K (7.7 K/9)

Translated Stats: 3.58 ERA, 7.8 H/9—1.0 HR/9—1.9 BB/9—7.0 K/9

Brad Halsey:

2004: (Yankees)
Actual Stats: 1-3 W-L, 6.47 ERA, 32.0 IP, 41 Hits (11.5 H/9), 4 HR (1.1 HR/9), 14 BB (3.9 BB/9), 25 K (7.0 K/9)

Career: (Minor League)
Actual Stats: 34-14 W-L, 3.26 ERA, 375.0 IP, 386 Hits (9.3 H/9), 15 HR (0.4 HR/9), 90 BB (2.2 BB/9), 296 K (7.1 K/9)

Dioner Navarro:

2004
Actual Stats (AA Trenton, AAA Columbus): .263 AVG/.341 OBP/.366 SLG-.707 OPS, 4 HR (45 RBI), 61/47 (1.30/1) K/BB

Career (Minor Leagues): .277 AVG/.350 OBP/.402 SLG--.752 OPS, 21 HR (168 RBI), 198/138 (1.43/1) K/BB

The Diamondbacks are getting a pitcher in Vazquez, who besides last season, his first in New York, has been nothing short of great throughout his career. They are also getting some very good prospects in Halsey and Navarro. While Halsey did, indeed, struggle in his brief stint with the Yankees last season, he has been great throughout his minor league career. Navarro, while not a power hitter, shows great patience at the plate (see K/BB ratio) and also has shown an above-average ability to get on base (see OBP).

On the other side of the deal, the Yankees are getting the man they have coveted since the trade deadline during the 2004 season, Randy Johnson. There is really nothing I can say to exemplify how great Johnson is, just look at the numbers. The Yankees are without question receiving a first-ballot Hall of Famer, and one of the best pitchers of all time. The only question mark that comes with Johnson would be his age (41).

Although Johnson is 41 and carries an injury risk with him, strictly because of his age, those risks were downgraded substantially last season when Johnson did not show any lasting effects from his injury in 2003 that sidelined him for half of the season. With Johnson being so dominant throughout his injury-free 2004 campaign, he proved to all of his critics—including the Yankees-- that injuries are a very small factor to consider when dealing with the future hall-of-famer.

A look at the money side of the deal will show that money actually means nothing to the Yankees.

To complete this deal the Yankees had to agree on a contract extension with Johnson, which they did; for 2 years at $32 million.

Combining the new extension with the $16 million due to Johnson in 2005 under his contract with the Diamondbacks, a contract the Yankees now own, Johnson is essentially being signed to a 3 year, $48 million deal by the Yankees.

As I clued in on earlier, the Yankees did not save any money in this deal. Here is a look at the contracts and salaries of the players they gave to Arizona.

Javier Vazquez is signed through 2007 and is due to make $10.5 million in 2005, $11.5 million in 2006, and $12.5 million in 2007, for a total salary of $34.5 million owed to Vazquez through 2007.

Both Halsey and Navarro are currently making league-minimum minor league salaries. For the sake of comparing and contrasting the figures, I will not include their minimal salaries when figuring out money saved or lost by both teams.

Subtracting Vazquez’s contract from Johnson’s will show that the Yankees are adding $13.5 million dollars to their payroll ($48 million minus $34.5 million). But, one must not forget that the Yankees also agreed to give the Diamondbacks $9 million in this trade. After adding that figure to the difference between the contracts, the Yankees end up adding a total of $22.5 million dollars to their payroll ($9 million plus $13.5 million). Which, in turn, would also mean that the Diamondbacks are gaining an extra $22.5 million for their team.

The role that Johnson will be asked to fill with they Yankees is pretty clear; pitch them to a World Series championship.

As for the roles that the newly acquired Diamondbacks will be asked to fill, they are not as simple.

Vazquez is already involved in trade rumors that would send him out of Arizona. If he weren’t traded though, he would be expected to pitch every fifth day at the top of the rotation, and return to the greatness that he experienced earlier in his career in the Montreal Expos organization. After all, he gets paid like a superstar and that is exactly what Arizona would expect out of him.

Brad Halsey will be given every chance to win a spot in the back of the rotation for the Diamondbacks in 2005.

As of the moment, Navarro is probably never going to play a game in the Diamondbacks organization. It is expected that he will be dealt to the Los Angeles Dodgers in a deal for RF Shawn Green. The Diamondbacks are able to trade away the young prospect because their depth at catcher runs three deep. For the 2005 season, 25 year old Koyie Hill, 23 year old Chris Snyder, and 34 year old Kelly Stinett will all be vying for the starting catching job in Arizona; meaning Navarro would be stepping into an already-crowded situation.

As for the question, “Who got the better end of the deal?” Normally, when a team saves $22.5 million, gains a pitcher who has been dominant throughout his entire career except one year (Vazquez), and gets two good prospects (Halsey, and Navarro), I would say this team gets the better end of the deal. This is not the case with this deal though, simply because of Randy Johnson.

There are few pitchers in the history of the game who have been, or are as dominant as Randy Johnson. He is one of only a few players who can carry a team to a World Series title, all by his lonesome. Paying $22.5 million for 3 years of Randy Johnson’s services is worth the money because the only thing that matters in baseball, or any sport for that matter, is winning; and Johnson gives the Yankees a better chance to do just that than any other time in recent memory.

Even after reviewing the dominance of Johnson, I call this deal a draw. The package that the Diamondbacks received for Johnson is nothing short of excellent. Plus, the players gained in the deal are all under 30 years of age to boot.

This deal clearly makes the Yankees the favorite to win the World Series again. As for the Diamondbacks, this deal is not only a very large step towards improvement in the future, but also a deal that will help them win now.

This was a great deal by both sides.

Thank you for reading,

Frank Bundy III

All the Fuss Over Carlos Beltran

Throughout this topsy-turvy off-season in 2004 there have been many trades and free agent signings. All of these though, will be paltry compared the signing of Carlos Beltran, the most sought-after free agent in 2004.

When this signing will happen, nobody knows. There are guesses that it will happen somewhere around January 8, 2004 because that is the last day that the Houston Astros (Beltran's former team) can resign him. Those are just guesses though.

There is no doubt though, that it will be a huge deal, worth a huge amount of money, when Beltran finally does sign.

Why is Carlos Beltran the most sought-after free agent? Why will he make the most money of all the free agents in 2004? Because teams project Beltran to have nothing but monster years in the future, and many of them. After all, he is only 27 years old--the age when most players, if capable, start their runs of dominance--and their statistics get better.

If this age theory does work out, and Beltran only gets better in the years to come, he would indeed be worth a very high salary.

Here are Beltran's statistics in every year of his career in which he accumulated 300+ AB's:

Stats presented as so: AB, AVG/OBP/SLG-OPS, (AVG/HR/RBI), SB/CS, K/BB

1999 KC- 663 AB--.297/.337/.454-.791--(.293/22/108)--27/8 SB/CS--123/46 K/BB

2000 KC- 372 AB--.247/.309/.366-.675--(.247/7/44)--10/0 SB/CS--69/35 K/BB

2001 KC- 617 AB--.306/.362/.514-.876--(.306/24/101)--31/1 SB/CS--120/52 K/BB

2002 KC- 637 AB--.273/.346/.501-.847--(.273/29/105)--35/7 SB/CS--135/71 K/BB

2003 KC- 521 AB--.307/.389/.522-.911--(.307/26/100)--46/4 SB/CS--81/72 K/BB

2004 KC/HOU- 599 AB--.267/.367/.548-.915--(.267/38/104)--42/3 SB/CS--101/92 K/BB

Career- 3467 AB, .284/.350/.490-.843--(.284/146/569)--192/23 (89.3%) SB/CS--641/371 (1.73/1) K/BB

As you can see, in terms of OPS, in the last three years Beltran is doing nothing but getting better.

The big question though, is "How will Beltran perform in 2005?" Well, obviously that question has no answer, all we can do is make projections as to what he'd do--and that is what I am here to do.

I will project Beltran's 2005 season using his statistics last season (his career-best according to OPS), and comparing them to his averages each of his past three seasons and "splitting the differences."

I will not bore anybody with the math involved in coming up with this "split the difference" season. I will just present the results.

Carlos Beltran (Split the difference)

2005: 606 AB--.260/.368/.559-.927 OPS--(.260/42/105)--43/2 (93.3%) SB/CS--99/99 (1.00/1) K/BB

That is a pretty awesome season, and shows that Beltran will, in fact, to continue to improve (according to OPS). If Beltran had that season for any team in 2005, I am sure the team would be more than happy to pay his enormous salary that year.

Since Beltran is only 27 though, it is entirely possible, as is for any player--but more so for a 27 year old--that he will not just have a "split the difference" season; he could have an ever better season than that.

With this possibility being ever so relevant for Beltran, I will project a 2005 season, not using the 50% difference I used in his "split the difference" season, but I will use a 120% difference (actually not a "difference" since it would be adding on to his stats) to project a "best-possible" season for Beltran in 2005.

Carlos Beltran (Best-possible)

2005: 615 AB--.251/.369/.576-.944 OPS--(.251/46/105)--43/1 (97.7%) SB/CS--95/108 (.880/1) K/BB

This season is even better than his "split the difference" season.

While this "best-possible" season is entirely possible, it is not probable. It is very probable though that Beltran WILL improve though. Since this is very probable I will now "split the difference" between Beltran's "split the difference" season, and his "best possible" season to come up with Beltran's "probable season."

Carlos Beltran (Probable)

2005: 610 AB, .256/.368/.568-.936 OPS--(.256/44/105)--43/2 (93.3%) SB/CS--97/104 (.933/1) K/BB

That, by the numbers, is a probable season for Carlos Beltran in 2005.

Is he worth the amount of money he potentially will make throughout his new contract ($200 million over 10 years)? No. The only reason he is not worth that amount of money though, is because, nobody, no matter how good they are, is worth $20 million a year.

Is he worth being paid the highest salary in baseball? That is debatable. He IS worth a salary that ranks among the highest in the league though--just look at the numbers.

All the fuss over Carlos Beltran is absolutely worth it. He is a young, talented player that has shown nothing but a great ability to play, and dominate, the game; and whose upside is still plentiful.

Thank you for reading,

Frank Bundy III

If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or suggestions, please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.

Upcoming Article

There has not been an article posted on "Serious Baseball" for so long (5 days--tomorrow) because I have been working on an article which would present my own personal ballpark factors, and the factors aren't working out.

Since the factors are not working out, there hasn't been an article posted about the factors because it would make no sense.

I will continue to work on these ballpark factors though--and hope to post that article someday.

In the meantime, it will be business as usual here at "Serious Baseball." I will continue to put a new article out every 3-4 days.

If there is ever a delay on an article, leading to an extended period of time between articles, I will post a notice explaining the reason for the delay--as I have here.

I apologize for the delay.

The next article, which will be posted either tomorrow (Jan. 5, 2005) or the next day (Jan. 6, 2005), and will be about free-agent Carlos Beltran. The article will include projections for his 2005 season, and also opinions about the possible amount of money he may or may not sign for.

Thank you for reading,

Frank Bundy III

If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or suggestions please do not hesitate to email me at frnkbndy@yahoo.com.