The Smart Yankees

What a perfect follow-up to my last article stating discord with the Rockies long-term signing of Troy Tulowitzki!

If you read that article you are aware that I believe the Rockies should have waited to sign Tulowitzki to a six-year contract. He should have had to—at least--show he can be successful at the Major League level again before the Rockies committed so many years.

Now the New York Yankees step in and show the right way to sign players.

Who would have thought that the Yankees would be the team setting the example of how to develop and sign youngsters?!

With rumored negotiations between the Bombers and their 25 year old second baseman Robinson Cano resulting in a possible contract anywhere from a four year/$30 million to six year/$56 million deal, we now have a template of how to “be patient” and use a player’s cheapest (pre-arbitration) years as an evaluation period to help make more-informed decisions.

Cano’s “evaluation period” showed that he, indeed, is worth a commitment.

Called up in 2005 Cano has been the New York Yankees full-time second baseman since then and has accumulated the following statistics (1720 plate appearances):

.314/.347/.490, 4.24 BB%, 12.03 K%

Those are very good numbers overall, but coming from a second baseman, they are great numbers. Combine this with the fact that Cano is a very good fielder and the Yankees have, truly, found a gem.

While some may look at those statistics above and say Cano doesn’t walk enough (2007 AL mean BB% of 8.54) and therefore isn’t a good bet to stay productive, I disagree.

There is no such thing as “not walking enough.” If a player’s strength is making contact, a lower walk rate doesn’t hurt him if he uses that strength and strikes out at a lower rate than average (2007 AL mean K% of 17.31).

Cano’s K% shows that he can put the ball in play, but his batting average shows that he is very good at collecting hits on those balls in play.

One thing that some may worry some critics about Cano is his career BABIP of .337 (compared to league average around .300). This does not worry me, and it obviously doesn’t bother the Yankees. The sample size (1720 plate appearances) that is Cano’s career shows that he does has some, innate, ability to collect more hits than average when he puts the ball in play.

Cano has not been lucky. The career he has posted to this point is legit, and any worry of a severe downturn in his production over the length of his new contract should be minimal.

The Yankees used the advantages given to them by the system—unlike the Rockies. They used Cano’s pre-arb years as a “minimum wage” way of evaluating his true talent and skill level, and then made a decision. And while there are no guarantees of Cano’s continued productivity, this was a better-informed decision and holds a better chance of success than the one the Rockies made just a few days ago.

Did the Rockies unnecessarily rush?

What’s the hurry?

Why did the Rockies feel the need to sign Troy Tulowitzki to a six year deal now—when he has a pre-arbitration year left? (Structure of contract can be found here.)

Why wouldn’t they just let him play out 2008—at minimum wage—and prove 2007 wasn’t a fluke before committing for the next six years?

Now, I know Tulowitzki was great last year; both offensively and defensively. I also know he had a good season in the minor leagues in 2006, and I do understand that he projects to be a very good player in the future.

Both the scouts and the numbers agree. But scouts, and numbers, are often wrong…especially in baseball.

It was just two short years ago in 2006 that Tulowitzki batted .291/.370/.473 in the Texas League (AA) over 484 plate appearances. Good numbers indeed, but not great. They do get better, though, when you consider his great BB/K numbers from that season. His BB% of 9.5 was a tad better than the average for the Texas League (9.16), but his K% of 14.67 was much better than the mean (18%). ***

The kid definitely showed patience and a good ability to make contact. He also posted a very good ISO (.182) for that level—Texas League average of .150—showing power was part of his game as well.

It seemed Tulowitzki was on the path to stardom. All he would have to do is post great numbers in AAA in 2007 and he’d be ready. Instead, after batting .321/.379/.434 in 53 Spring Training AB’s before the 2007 season, the Rockies decided to have “Tulo” forego a season in AAA and inserted him into their every day lineup.

This was definitely the wrong move, right? After all, “Tulo” would only be 22 in 2007, and as noted before, while he was very good in the minors, it was only one year, and it’s not like he was extraordinary.

Anyhow, the rest is history, and apparently it was the right move. Tulowitzki went onto lead the Rockies to the World Series in 2007 while batting .291/.359/.479, smashing 24 HR’s, and fielding the shortstop position wonderfully.

Should those two seasons (one at the double A level) be enough to make the Rockies commit to him for six seasons—especially when he has a pre-arb year left?

It shouldn’t be.

When you consider that Tulowitzki was aided by an abnormally high BABIP in 2007 (.336 vs. NL average of .301) you’d have to assume he was somewhat lucky. Shouldn’t the Rockies want to see if this high BABIP was a “repeatable” skill?

Also, you’d think the Rockies would want to see if Tulowitzki’s high K% would fall.

By striking out 130 times in 2007--19.2% of his plate appearances--Tulowitzki tied Alfonso Soriano for 11th in the NL in that category. While we know strikeouts aren’t deemed as bad as they was 30 years ago, I’d think it’d be in the Rockies best interest to see if Tulowitzki can lower that number before committing.

Also, even though this deal make Tulowitzki’s home Coors Field for the foreseeable future, wouldn’t you think the Rockies would be a little worried about his horrible road/home splits from 2007:

Home: .326/.392/.568, 15 HR
Road: .256/.327/.393, 9 HR

Shouldn’t the Rockies want “Tulo” to prove he isn’t just another player who, outside of Coors Field, isn’t even average?

These are all things that should have prevented the Rockies from signing Tulowitzki long term when they could have—at least—used 2008 as an extremely cost effective way of deeming his 2007 season as fluke, or a barometer of his true skill.

Now don’t get me wrong. I hope this deal works out. I really do. I hope Tulowitzki becomes the next Derek Jeter, and leads Colorado to the post-season for many years to come.

The Rockies didn’t use the advantages that are granted to them—three pre-arb, “minimum wage” years—by the system; and I’m just scared it may come back and bite them.

***Texas League averages from Minorleaguesplits.com.

Frank Bundy III

Carlos Pena Going Forward

Draw more walks, hit more home runs.

Sounds like a pretty good formula for success, does it not? After all, that is the exact formula Carlos Pena used in 2007 to win the American League Comeback Player of the Year award.

The funny thing about that formula is that it is so simple. Usually, when looking at a season where a player drastically improved you can point to several things he improved upon that led to his newfound success.

There are usually many factors that come together to produce a players breakout/career year. For example, you might find that a player drew more walks, struck out less, hit more line drives, had a higher batting average on balls in play, and hit more ground balls to contribute to his improvement.

Not with Carlos Pena though. He only did two things significantly better to improve…and what an improvement it was!

In 2007 he set career highs in HR (46), BA (.282), OBP (.411), SLG (.627), OPS (1.038), Hits (138), Doubles (29), RBI (121), and BB (103).

What led to all of this improvement? Go back and read the first line of this article.

Let’s take a look at some stats of Pena’s through 2006, compared with those same stats in the 2007 season:

PA/HR: 22.37 thru 2006, 13.3 in 2007

Here is an obvious, large improvement. Pena hit a HR once every 22 plate appearances through 2006, then exploded to hit one every 13 plate appearances in 2007.

PA/K: 3.83 thru 2006, 4.31 in 2007

Yeah, Pena stuck out a little less in 2007, but not by a significant amount. He pretty much struck out once every four plate appearances through 2006, and in 2007.

PA/BB: 9.21 thru 2006, 5.94 in 2007

Here’s another significant improvement in 2007. After only walking once every 9 plate appearances through 2006, he walked once every six in 2007.

GB%: 38.11 thru 2006, 37.46 in 2007

In 2007 Pena hit a tad less ground balls, but not by much at all.

FB%: 42.66 thru 2006, 44.51 in 2007

Obviously, in 2007 Pena turned his ground balls into fly balls. Again, though, this is not a significant difference from the rest of his career coming into the season.

LD%: 19.23 thru 2006, 18.03 in 2007

He actually did a little worse in this category in 2007. This one is close to being a significant, but not enough to call it an extreme difference.

HR/FB: 17.62 thru 2006, 29.11 in 2007

We can call this an extreme improvement. Even though Pena didn’t hit many more fly balls overall in 2007, many more of them became home runs.

BABIP: .295 thru 2006, .305 in 2007

One of the biggest indicators of luck doesn’t show a high degree of fortune for Pena in 2007. While his BABIP was higher than his career average coming into the season, it wasn’t that much higher, and was exactly the league average in 2007.

Pena only did two things significantly better in 2007 to become the beast he was last year. But is this success something he can maintain long-term? Or even throughout the duration of the new three year, $24 million contract he just signed with the Tampa Bay Rays?

One way too look at this would be to just simply look at his BABIP and say, “Well, last year wasn’t based on luck, so he can stay this productive.”

While it’s a fact that Pena “legitimately” posted the numbers he did last year without the aid of a high BABIP, I think decline is in his future.

Pitchers that make it to the Major League level aren’t stupid. And the employees of the teams they pitch for, that prepare scouting reports on Carlos Pena, aren’t either. They know that the key to Pena’s breakout season was the abnormally high amount of walks he had drawn.

While this is somewhat a “skill” shown by Pena—to draw walks--it depends highly on the pitcher throwing the balls. A batter can be as adept as ever at taking balls, but that won’t mean anything if the pitcher isn’t throwing them.

Put simply, if pitchers throw more strikes to Pena in the future, he’s going to be less productive (when I say strikes I, obviously, don’t mean meatballs down the heart of the plate). Now, I know that sounds ridiculous, but Pena’s career batting average shows he isn’t great at collecting hits.

While he did do a good job hitting strikes last season, as shown by his .282 batting average, his career number coming into 2007 was .243. That .243 accumulated over 1924 plate appearances says more than the .282 he posted in 612 plate appearances last season.

Carlos Pena is not a good hitter for average. He may be better than he was before 2007, but he is still a “high walk, low average” hitter; who strikes out way too much.

While there are some hitters out there who have had a successful career using the “high walk, low average” attack, most of them can at least post a league average batting average (.269 in 2007). Pena is not this kind of hitter.

When pitchers throw him more strikes in the future, Pena will be forced to swing at more pitches, most likely resulting in less contact, which in turn will lead to less walks.

Just by the mere fact of getting more strikes to hit, Pena will not be able to use half of his “formula for success in 2007;” draw more walks, hit more HR’s.

As for the other half of the formula, hitting more HR’s, this is an area Pena will suffer in for the obvious reason that he cannot sustain the type of success he had in 2007, again. I know this isn’t “sabermetric” enough of a reason, but Carlos Pena will hit less home runs going forward simply because he is not Alex Rodriguez, David Ortiz, or Barry Bonds—or even close to those guys.

Does this bring him back down to the .243/.332/.459 hitter he was before 2007? Quite possibly; and it also doesn’t help that next year will be his age-30 season.

Pena will be a better hitter in 2008 because he has shown he can have success in the league, but, I wouldn’t use the numbers he posted in 2007 as a starting point for improvement. I would use his pre-2007 numbers, and post a small improvement from there.

Frank Bundy III